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SECURITY AND MIGRATION: A CONCEPTUAL EXPLORATION 
 
Christopher S. Browning 
University of Warwick 
 
 
‘A nation without borders is not a nation. There must be a wall across the southern 
border’  
(Trump 2015). 
 
‘The picture, taken on Wednesday morning, depicted the dark-haired toddler, wearing a 
bright-red T-shirt and shorts, washed up on a beach, lying face down in the surf not far 
from Turkey’s fashionable resort town of Bodrum’  
(Smith 2015). 
 
Introduction 
 
Without doubt migration is an emotive issue. It is emotive because it raises fundamental questions 
about the rights of states relative to the rights of persons, about borders as sites of inclusion and 
exclusion, of ordering and control, and ultimately because migration puts security – viewed by many 
as the pre-eminent value upon which all else depends – in question. The above quotes provide two 
contrasting and polarised images of the nexus between migration and security.  
 
The first comes from Donald J. Trump’s campaign for the Republican presidential nomination. It offers 
a rather traditional conception of the role of the state, the centrality of borders as sites of national 
security and, in the broader context in which the statement was delivered, a view of migration as 
inherently threatening to that national security. Indeed, the quote was part of a broader statement 
on the need for America to institute a much tougher regime along its southern border with Mexico. 
Amongst other things the statement accused the Mexican government of ‘using illegal migration to 
export the crime and poverty in their own country’, (Trump 2015) which was itself a toned down 
version of his earlier more explicit accusation that the Mexican government was deliberately exporting 
drugs, crime, rapists and ‘tremendous infectious disease’ (Neate 2015). While Trump is careful to 
single out illegal immigrants, there is obviously a danger that his invective comes to tarnish all migrants 
crossing the southern border. Migrants, from this perspective, are threatening, as too is the Mexican 
government, which Trump states is ‘not our friend’ (quoted in Walker 2015). Moreover, the title of 
Trump’s presidential campaign statement, ‘Immigration reform that will make America great again’, 
also makes it clear that the stakes raised by uncontrolled migration are high. Immigration into the US 
is here implicitly depicted as a cause of American decline, or at least curtailing America’s greatness 
and what it can be in the world; in short it is existential. 
 
For Trump, therefore, the border is the pre-eminent site of security that needs to be enforced and 
made impermeable through the construction of a wall regulating all movement across the border. This 
is a common view. Indeed, Trump’s statement closely parallels President Ronald Reagan’s earlier Cold 
War assertion that ‘A nation that cannot control its border is not a nation’. In many respects this is not 
an unreasonable proposition. It is obviously the case that states unable to control movement across 
their borders will be more susceptible to various transnational threats, be that in terms of vulnerability 
to the activities of transnational criminal organisations, infiltration by foreign state agents, the spread 
of infectious diseases, or terrorist attacks. Indeed, states deemed unable to control their borders are 
often depicted as at risk of ‘failing’. An oft mooted example is Pakistan’s apparent inability to control 
the movement of Taleban insurgents across the border with Afghanistan and NATO’s various 
incursions in pursuit of them, often without Pakistan’s explicit authorisation. All this suggests that 
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Pakistan’s sovereignty is both empirically weak and often recognised only in the breach. However, if 
border control is understood as central to state sovereignty, then the fact that an estimated 11 million 
undocumented (illegal) immigrants currently reside in the US suggests that America is also vulnerable 
to such claims and that behind Trump’s undiplomatic and shrill pronouncements lie a number of 
important issues for consideration (Massey 2015). 
 
The second quote from a report in The Guardian newspaper offers a very different view of the 
migration-security nexus. The report describes what, at the time, became one of the most poignant 
and discussed images of the Syrian refugee crisis. It describes the well-publicised tragic picture of 
Aylan Kurdi, a three-year old Syrian refugee who drowned, along with his five-year old brother, his 
mother and at least 9 others while trying to escape to Europe by inflatable dinghy from Turkey 
(Dearden 2015). He died, in no small part, because of the desire of European states to use stricter 
border and asylum regimes in order to limit the flow of migrants and refugees. Creating barriers to 
movement, raising the risks of travel posed to those impelled to cross borders, it is hoped will reduce 
the numbers of those willing to make the journey. Consequently, like many others Aylan’s parents 
paid unscrupulous people traffickers for their perilous passage. Indeed, the United Nations High 
Commission for Refugees estimated that as of 19 November 2015 850,571 ‘refugees and migrants’ 
had arrived by sea to Europe during the course of the year, with a further 3,485 having died or ‘gone 
missing’ at sea (Ash 2015). 
 
Evidently Aylan was not a rapist, drug smuggler or criminal. His picture reminded viewers, and not 
least those espousing much anti-immigrant sentiment in Europe, of the human element of many 
migration stories. Although the conflict in Syria has so far resulted in over 4 million people fleeing Syria 
for other countries – there are even more internally displaced persons within Syria – with thousands 
having died trying to get to Europe, the personalisation of this wider tragedy in the image of a limp 
boy washed up on a beach added a considerable human/humanitarian dimension to what in Europe, 
had become an increasingly ‘Trumpian’ position about the need for bordering. Most notably it 
contributed to German Chancellor Angela Merkel’s decision to implement, if only for what turned out 
to be a limited time period, and in the face of much criticism, an ‘open door’ policy with respect to 
Syrian refugees. The picture of Aylan shifted the security discussion from the state to those on the 
move, from considerations of national security to those of human security. When framed this way 
security requires a more cooperative, less exclusionary approach, and one that challenges the role of 
borders as primarily sites of division and exclusion. 
 
The Trump-Aylan comparison therefore suggests that the relationship between security and migration 
is both complex and complicated. Since it entails crossing borders it could be suggested that 
(international) migration inevitably raises questions of security – but whose, in what ways and what 
should be done about it? In a context in which the numbers are increasing year on year, in which, 
according to the International Organization for Migration (2015), 1 in every 33 persons is a migrant, 
this is an issue that will not go away anytime soon. This chapter seeks to unpack some of the 
complexity of the security-migration nexus through an exploratory unpicking of the concept of 
security. The chapter shows the multiplicity of claims and counter claims that are made about the 
security effects of migration and in doing so argues that all such debates are inevitably politicised 
around the relative prioritisation of various interests, preferences and values. More particularly, 
however, the chapter argues that while migration certainly raises significant challenges, the discussion 
of migration in the language of security can have significant constitutive effects that, beyond typically 
framing the nature of policy responses considered, are also often fundamental to how identities of us 
and them, and perceptions of security and threat, are conceived. This means any discussion of the 
relationship between migration and security also raises ethical considerations and dilemmas. 
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Conceptualising and Theorising Security in International Relations 
 
Security is an alluring and intoxicating concept and often reached for as a ‘winning argument’. This is 
because it is seen to refer to fundamental values or is viewed as the primary value upon which the 
pursuit of all other (secondary) goals depends. Arguing against security is therefore difficult, while 
invoking it can disarm the arguments of dissenters. Moreover, because of its connection to the 
protection of core values security is also a motivational and mobilising concept; it focuses minds and 
issues a call for action.  
 
Yet security also often appears elusive, a continual work in progress, while its meaning and what it 
refers to is highly contested. To get a better grip on security scholars of International Relations often 
interrogate it through asking a number of questions. In doing so they seek to show the bases upon 
which different understandings and preferences about security lie. There are a large number of 
questions one might ask about security, but for the purposes of this exploration four are sufficient.1  
 
The first question we might ask has been illustrated in the Trump-Aylan comparison above and focuses 
on ‘whose security’ is at stake? In international politics the historical tendency has been to focus on 
state security. This is because states are generally viewed as both the primary actors in the 
international system, but also because, from a social contract theory approach, the raison d’être of 
states is seen as being that of providing for their citizens’ security. Insofar as states are themselves 
insecure they will be unable to perform this function, and it is therefore imperative that state security 
becomes the core focus of attention and state policy (Buzan 1991). This is, however, an idealisation, 
with critics frequently highlighting that in practice states have often been a primary source of 
insecurity, anxiety and even terror for their citizens (Booth 1991). Obvious examples include Cambodia 
under the Khmer Rouge, Germany under the Nazi’s, the Soviet Union under Stalin. Indeed, in many 
countries proclamations in the name of state security have functioned as little more than euphemistic 
justifications for a prioritisation of the security of ruling regimes. Critics who make this observation 
are therefore suggesting that the prioritisation of state security confuses means with ends; that 
ultimately it is the security of people that needs to be prioritised as the referent object of security. 
This is, in particular, the position upheld by advocates of ‘human security’ and is a view endorsed by 
the United Nations (United Nations Development Programme 1994: 22-4). In principle, however, 
security could be focused on any identifiable referent object, be it states, individuals/humans, ethnic 
and religious groups, the environment/planet or even framed in terms of the protection of particular 
values like liberty and freedom. Ultimately the prioritisation of one referent object of security over 
that of others is a political choice. Thus, even though such prioritisations are frequently presented in 
objective terms, their political implications become evident insofar as prioritising one referent may 
entail negative security implications for other possible referents. 
 
The identification of possible referent objects of security, however, raises a second question of ‘what 
security entails’ in different contexts? Again, various answers are available which, broadly speaking, 
locate themselves at different points along a spectrum from security as limited to ensuring physical 
survival (as an individual, group, state, ecosystem) to security as requiring a certain quality with 
respect to the conditions of existence. For instance, advocates of human security are split between 
narrow and broader understandings of its basic requirements. Narrow conceptions focus on 
eradicating threats of physical violence – what the UN terms ‘freedom from fear’ – therefore 
prioritising issues of conflict prevention, conflict resolution and post-conflict reconstruction. 
Advocates of this approach, for example, have therefore been key proponents of attempts to impose 
bans and regulations on the use of weapons, be it in terms of the Ottawa Treaty prohibiting the use 
of anti-personnel landmines or more recent attempts to regulate the arms trade through an Arms 
                                                          
1 For similar analyses see Terriff et al. (1999: 17-22); Williams (2013); Smith (2005); Baldwin (1997); Rothschild 
(1995). 
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Trade Treaty. In contrast, broader conceptions of human security include an emphasis on the need to 
tackle problems of underdevelopment that blight the lives of billions – what the UN terms ‘freedom 
from want’. Advocates of this approach have therefore been keen to support the 2000-2015 United 
Nations Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) and the Global Goals for Sustainable Development 
that have replaced them.  
 
However, whether the emphasis is on the physical security of ‘freedom from fear’ or issues of welfare 
connected to ‘freedom from want’, both raise further questions. For instance, it is unclear that the 
protection of the physical security of existence is uniformly viewed as the primary value. It has, for 
example, been argued that the story of the Melians refusal to surrender to the Athenians in full 
knowledge that the decision sealed their imminent slaughter, suggests that for the Melians dying in 
defence of their conceptions of selfhood and honour was preferential to the shame of surrender 
(Lindemann 2010: 15; Steele 2008: 94-5). The same might be said of suicide bombers, but also of 
anyone willing to risk their life in defence/pursuit of a cause. Likewise, an emphasis on conditions of 
existence and ‘freedom from want’ raises the question of what base line conditions of welfare security 
should look like. Be it in terms of ‘freedom from fear’ or ‘freedom from want’, therefore, there is 
always a question of what constitutes sufficiency. Put differently, how much fear is acceptable and 
how much food, material possessions, education, health etc… is required to meet ‘basic human 
needs’?  
 
This raises a further issue with important ethico-political dimensions. One of the temptations and 
dangers of the desire for security is that it can easily become all encompassing. Indeed, the idea of 
‘total security’ can be highly seductive but needs to be treated cautiously. ‘Total security’ is both an 
illusion but also undesirable. As various philosophers (not least Nietzsche and Heidegger) have argued, 
ultimately the fulfilling life is one that recognises the time limited (and hence ultimately insecure) 
nature of all existence and therefore the need to embrace a certain amount of risk, anxiety and 
insecurity. However, the temptation of ‘total security’ is strong and can be seen in the periodical rise 
of various manifestations of the ‘security state’ over time. One example of this has been the response 
of various Western states following 9/11 and the declaration of the War on Terror, following which 
new security agencies have been created, bordering practices reinforced, with citizens constantly 
encouraged to be extra vigilant, and where civil liberties have been steadily sacrificed in the name of 
security. 
 
A third question to ask, therefore, is ‘what is the threat’ and where the suggestion just made is that 
the pursuit of security itself is something of which it is important to be wary. Indeed, insofar as the 
pursuit of security undermines civil liberties some would argue that the prioritisation of security as 
the core value should be reconsidered – and where the fundamental challenge is rather how to 
balance security against other important values. More usually, however, the question of threats is 
answered in terms of how threats are identified and prioritised relative to each other. It is important 
to recognise that there are no objective grounds upon which this can be done. Threats which may 
appear self-evident and objectively identifiable are only so to the extent to which social consensus has 
emerged around particular issues. As we will see, immigration provides an excellent example of this 
since there is considerable disagreement within societies about whether or not immigration is a threat 
per se – it is, after all, often viewed as a solution to some security issues – and if it is, exactly what it is 
seen to threaten.  
 
Crucially, though, the way in which threats are prioritised often has much to do with the 
institutionalised power of those making the claim and the context within which such claims are made. 
This takes us back to the first question of referent objects and where it is evident that states and those 
that speak on their behalf (be they political leaders or institutionally located security professionals) 
have much greater capacity and power to set security agendas. It is therefore important always to be 
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mindful of in whose interest security agendas are operating. One final point here, though, is that the 
politics of prioritisation is usually influenced by considerations of whether identified threats are 
deemed manageable or not. For Wæver (1995) it is the manageability of threats that marks out a 
situation of security from one of insecurity. In respect of migration this is an important point, since 
most security debates on the issue are not concerned with migration per se, but rather with levels of 
migration and their associated challenges. 
 
The fourth question to highlight is one that gets right to the heart of public policy considerations and 
asks ‘how is security to be achieved’? Broadly speaking answers to this question tend to be inflected 
with either a cooperative or competitive mind-set. Competitive approaches see security as limited and 
relative and where increasing one’s own security will always be at the expense of enhanced insecurity 
for others. It is precisely this view of security which characterises traditional (neo)realist accounts and 
theories of International Relations that depict the international system as comprised of states located 
in an unforgiving Hobbesian anarchy (see Waltz 1979; Mearsheimer 2004). In stereotyped terms this 
power political view is premised on the assumption that security requires power (both military and 
economic – though with an emphasis on military dimensions), that trust is in short supply (and 
potentially naïve), and that therefore prudent states will abide by a logic of self-help in a more general 
competition of all against all for resources and, hence, security. Indeed, such approaches have tended 
to be critical of the broadening out of security, both to different referent objects beyond the state, 
but also to different issues beyond that of territorial defence, calculations of the balance of power and 
military threat assessments and strategies. From this perspective the essence of security is ultimately 
about war and where the broadening of the security agenda is not only seen to pose challenges for 
the intellectual coherence of debates about security, but may also be dangerous and irresponsible 
because it threatens to divert attention from these ‘core’ concerns and responsibilities of the state 
(Walt 1991). Except insofar as migration raises such concerns it therefore should not be on the security 
agenda at all. 
 
In contrast, cooperative approaches view security as something that is held in common. As such 
security is not a limited resource, but something that can be expanded and fostered through 
developing positive and trusting relations between individuals and groups. Various liberal and more 
‘critical’ (e.g. constructivist, post-structuralist, Marxist, feminist) approaches within International 
Relations have specifically adopted and advocated more cooperative approaches to security – though 
often in different and not always compatible ways. However, while (neo)realist approaches have a 
zero-sum understanding of the interdependent nature of security – where my security relies on others 
insecurity – these approaches all believe that, given sufficient political will, security interdependence 
can be framed in win-win terms – where my security depends on others security. This suggests that in 
a world of limited resources the solution to security problems is not best pursued through hoarding 
and sequestration (which might in fact generate security tensions – not least in terms of providing 
incentives for mass migration amongst impoverished communities), but rather through enhancing 
access and more equitable distribution (Galtung 1969; Booth 2007). Cooperative approaches to 
security are therefore much more likely to emphasise the promotion of justice and human rights, not 
least through tackling the structural causes of insecurity. 
 
As will become evident below the questions of ‘whose security’, ‘what security entails’, ‘what is the 
threat’ and ‘how is security to be achieved’ are fundamental to understanding the nature of 
contemporary security debates about migration. Before turning to these debates, however, one 
further theoretical point needs mention. Evident in the above discussion on competitive vs. 
cooperative approaches to security is a deeper disjuncture about the purposes and constitutive role 
of security theorising (and social theories in general). (Neo)realist theories adopt what Robert Cox 
(1981) terms a ‘problem solving’ approach to theory. Problem solving theories are characterised by 
their ‘scientific’ commitment to explain the world ‘as it is’. Problem solving theories therefore 
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maintain a distinction between theory and the world ‘out there’ and can be termed problem solving 
because, in taking the world ‘as it is’, they seek to offer advice on how best to cope with those 
empirical realities (Williams 2013: 3). In contrast, while some cooperative approaches (e.g. liberal 
approaches) to security are also ‘problem solving’ in their underpinnings, essentially disagreeing with 
(neo)realists as to the empirical reality of the world ‘out there’, the more critically inclined of the 
cooperative approaches view theory, not simply as referencing and explaining a world out there, but 
as part of that world and therefore playing an important role in constituting the very nature of social 
reality. For them, the danger of the ‘pessimistic’ description of international security environments 
offered by (neo)realists is that they convince policy makers to act as if their theories were true 
descriptions of social reality and therefore become self-fulfilling. For critical approaches language is 
not simply referential, but constitutive, and therefore the language we use matters (Wæver 2002: 28-
9). Indeed, insofar as this chapter has already pointed to the prioritising and mobilising power of 
security language, this should be evident.  
 
All this, however, is not to say that ‘critical’ approaches are inevitably ‘optimistic’ and targeted 
towards pursuing more cooperative approaches to security. While some are, drawing succour from 
the possibilities that in changing the terms of the debate it may be possible to advance what they view 
as more normatively progressive agendas, (e.g. see Booth 2007) others have been more inclined to 
limit their normative advocacy to encouraging analysts to expose the constitutive dynamics and 
political implications that underpin various claims about security. 
 
 
Migration and Security: Challenges and Opportunities 
 
This focus on the constitutive role of language provides a good way into discussing the migration-
security nexus in more depth since it immediately suggests we should be cautious about unthinkingly 
reproducing the terms of debate within which migration is frequently discussed. There are two 
obvious parts to this. One concerns the politics and implications of debating migration in the language 
of security and is the focus of the next section. The other concerns the more specific politics of 
categorisation that attends almost all debates about migration, and which is also evident in the Trump-
Aylan comparison introduced above.  
 
Trump’s concern, we have seen, is with ‘illegal’ immigrants, a category of migrant he argues is 
problematically infiltrated by ‘rapists, drug runners, and other criminals’ (Walker 2015). Indeed, he is 
keen to stress that ‘Many fabulous people come in from Mexico [as well] and our country is better for 
it. But these people are here legally’ (quoted in Walker 2015). Evident here is that the categorical 
distinction drawn in Trump’s discourse between ‘legal’ and ‘illegal’ migrants is not simply one 
determined by whether or not migrants have entered the United States through official procedures, 
but is also morally infused with notions of good and bad (and perhaps even evil). Illegal immigrants 
are not simply undesirable because they crossed the border without official sanction, but because 
they can be expected to pose a threat to the physical security, health and property of America and its 
citizens. In short, these are bad people.2 No doubt, among the 11 million undocumented migrants 
currently residing in America there are some rapists, drug runners and criminals. It is very unlikely they 
all are, and rather more likely that such people comprise a very small proportion. By the same token, 
there are also no doubt undesirable elements among those people that have crossed into the United 
States legally, just as there are in the American population at large. 
 
Such normative presumptions are also evident in Europe with respect to the Syrian refugee crisis and 
where there has been considerable political discussion as to the right terminology to use to describe 
                                                          
2 Ben Carsen, another candidate in the race for the Republican presidential nomination, even compared Syrian 
refugees to ‘rabid dogs’, thereby dehumanising them (Flores 2015). 
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them. The key issue has been the extent to which the word ‘migrant’ has become infused with 
negative connotations in European political debate and where critics argue that the categorisation of 
Syrians fleeing their country as ‘migrants’ stirs up resentment against them, feeds intolerance and 
xenophobia and undermines humanitarian efforts to help them (Marsh 2015; Ruz 2015). Those 
pushing for a more concerted humanitarian approach to their plight have argued they should be 
labelled ‘refugees’ instead as this term emphasises both their vulnerability (as opposed to 
threateningness) and their legal rights to protection (and the obligation of other states to provide this) 
under international law via the 1948 UN Declaration of Human Rights and the 1951 Refugee 
Convention (Peoples and Vaughan-Williams 2010: 136). 
 
There are a couple of things worth noting about these cases. First it highlights that categorisation is 
politically relevant and where the label applied can have the effect of shifting which referent object 
of security is prioritised – the state or the migrant. Thus, while distinctions drawn between different 
types of migrant – be it legal/illegal, temporary/permanent, voluntary/forced, 
economic/refugee/asylum-seeker – can provide an important way of trying to understand the nature 
of phenomena underway and the different drivers and causes of migration, it is also important to 
understand the extent to which many of these terms have become politically (and morally) loaded 
and variously legitimising/delegitimising in their effects. Second, it is important to recognise that, once 
again, these labels are not demarcated by ‘objective’ criteria. For instance, whether someone is 
defined as a legal or illegal economic migrant will depend on the criteria (often framed in terms of 
economic needs) of the state they are trying to enter – criteria that has a tendency to change over 
time. Similarly, whether someone is defined as a ‘voluntary economic migrant’ or as being forced to 
move in order to escape dire and life debilitating poverty, is very much a matter of perspective. 
Meanwhile, while under international law states are obliged to provide protection to anyone seeking 
asylum from persecution, states are free to determine their own criteria for what constitutes a 
legitimate asylum claim (Bali 2013: 525). Thus it is that women facing physical or sexual abuse as a 
result of the culturally inscribed practices of the society in which they live were able to claim asylum 
in the United States during the presidency of Bill Clinton, had this right removed under the presidency 
of George Bush, only for it to be restored during the presidency of Barack Obama in 2009 (Smith 2010: 
298). There is, therefore, considerable power evident in the ability of states to assign migrants to 
different categories, with this itself emphasising their vulnerability. 
 
As noted earlier, however, the relationship between migration and security is both complicated and 
contested. Indeed, the distinction drawn between legal and illegal migration is itself indicative of the 
fact that migration may itself be viewed as being a benefit to security as much as a threat to it. And, 
of course, the security implications of migration depend very much on the referent object (‘whose 
security’) we focus on. 
 
For instance, migration can be viewed as having a security dividend for various referents. For migrants 
it can obviously offer escape from political, religious, ethnic or gendered persecution, from war and 
famine, or can offer the chance of economic enhancement through access to a different labour 
market. It is also frequently undertaken for reasons of family reunification. For states of origin there 
may also be benefits in encouraging emigration. In this respect, Donald Trump is right in pointing out 
that the Mexican government has actively promoted both legal and illegal emigration of its citizens to 
the United States. In part this is because it has been viewed as a way to ease some of Mexico’s internal 
economic problems of high unemployment and its attendant welfare burden. Emigration, however, 
does not just provide a safety valve for tensions that may develop as a result of these problems, but 
states of origin (and citizens left behind) also benefit from the remittances that migrants send back to 
their families. The figures here can be surprising, with the The World Bank (2014: 2, 4) estimating that 
in 2013 they totalled $404 billion, of which India received $70 billion, China $60 billion and Mexico 
$22 billion. For Tajikistan, remittances accounted for a staggering 52% of its total GDP. And it is also 
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the case that political parties, ethnic groups and governments in states of origin have also seen 
emigration as a means to rid their country of groups deemed undesirable. At its most extreme this can 
take the form of ethnic cleansing as, for example, was widespread during the wars occasioning the 
break-up of Yugoslavia in the 1990s. However, it was also evident in the run-up to the enlargement of 
the European Union in 2004, when it became apparent that officials in some of the accession countries 
in Eastern Europe saw membership as offering the opportunity of reducing the size of their Roma 
populations as a result of the EU’s commitment to free movement. 
 
Lastly, states of destination can also see a security imperative in encouraging immigration. For 
example, foreign migrant workers are often seen as a solution to various economic and social policy 
problems, be it the need for (un)skilled workers and entrepreneurs in order to maintain international 
economic competitiveness, the need to counteract an ageing population and generate enough tax 
revenues to pay for pensions and associated welfare costs, or the need to find workers to fill shortages 
in strategically important professions and industries. In respect of this latter issue the United Kingdom, 
has, for example, for many years been forced to trawl the world for health professionals in order to 
staff its much admired National Health Service. Given our particular focus on security, however, it is 
also notable that in many countries migrants increasingly make up a sizeable number of the nation’s 
fighting forces, and not just once they have become naturalised citizens. Thus, whereas historically 
bearing arms through conscription was deemed a fundamental duty of those who were already 
citizens, in many countries, including the United States, serving in the military as a non-citizen has 
become one route towards being granted citizenship – a practice which gives the ‘national’ in national 
security an ironic flavour (U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services: no date).  
  
Of course, migration can also create security challenges and vulnerabilities. As in the case of Aylan 
Kurdi and the thousands of others who have died trying to cross international borders, or the hundreds 
of thousands of (mainly) women and girls trafficked annually as part of the international sex trade, 
migration can be fraught with risks of exploitation, violence and death. In short, illegal trafficking has 
become big business for various transnational criminal organisations. This includes ‘terrorist’ groups 
like ISIS which by May 2015 was reported to have already generated up to $323 million from such 
activities (Walt 2015). Relatedly, and as demonstrated on 11 September 2001, migrants can also pose 
a direct threat to the state of destination, with all the 9/11 terrorists being non-American citizens, 
most of whom had entered the US legally.  
 
However, security challenges can also assume a more political dimension, as when granting asylum 
entails at least implicit criticism of the country from which asylum is sought. A state’s asylum policy 
can therefore potentially damage diplomatic relations between countries. A good recent example of 
this was Ecuador’s decision in 2012 to grant asylum to Julian Assange, the founder of Wikileaks, who 
was subsequently holed up in the Ecuadorian Embassy in London, thereby avoiding extradition to 
Sweden to face prosecution for sexual offences. Assange’s fear, upheld by Ecuador, was that from 
Sweden he would subsequently be extradited to America where he would face trial and almost certain 
lengthy imprisonment for Wikileaks’ publication of US diplomatic and military files leaked to the 
organisation in 2010 by Chelsea Manning. Ecuador’s decision to grant political asylum soured relations 
with both the UK and the US, much in the same way as Russia’s protection of Edward Snowdon from 
the arms of American justice has done for its relations with the United States. Tensions like these can 
be exacerbated when larger groups of migrants who have fled persecution are involved and that 
mobilise on mass against the ruling regime in their home state. For instance, the 4-5 million Palestinian 
refugees in Lebanon, Syria and Jordan, many descendants of an original 700,000 who were forced out 
of Israel during the 1948 Arab-Israel conflict, have been an enduring irritant for these countries 
relations with Israel, a major challenge for the Middle East peace process, but have also at times 
created problems for domestic stability (Bali 2013: 526). 
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High levels of migration can also create security challenges of a more social and economic nature. 
States or origin, particularly in the developing world, typically face the difficulty of coping with skills 
shortages as their brightest and best are enticed to fill vacancies in the developed world. The World 
Bank, for example, has identified ten countries that in 2000 lost over 70% of their tertiary educated 
population to emigration. Similarly, it is estimated that around 20-30% of all physicians trained in sub-
Saharan Africa take up posts elsewhere (The World Bank 2011: 18, 33). Such movements embed 
structural inequalities that lie at the heart of broader conceptions of human security and raise 
questions about the developed world’s commitment to tackling global poverty and improving global 
health as laid out in the Millennium Development Goals (Browning 2013: 97-8). However, it is also 
evident that high levels of immigration pose important challenges to receiving states, which face 
logistical and economic burdens in terms of meeting enhanced housing, education and other needs. 
Likewise, while business communities are often favourable to high levels of immigration, seeing it as 
creating a larger pool of workers to choose from, and which in turn can help keep wage costs down, 
precisely for this latter reason workers’ unions sometimes complain that high levels of immigration 
threaten to undermine the security of their members by undermining their ability to push for better 
pay and conditions. 
 
 
Societal Security and Securitization 
 
Tensions over the economic, social, political and security implications of migration often crystallise in 
debates about the integration of migrant groups into the wider national community. In short migrants 
are often seen to pose a threat to ‘societal security’, a concept which concerns the ability of a 
community to sustain its conception of self-identity. As Buzan et al. (1998: 119) put it ‘Societal 
insecurity exists when communities of whatever kind define a development as a threat to their survival 
as a community’. A good example of such fears was presented by Samuel Huntington, a political 
scientist best known for his theories about ‘the clash of civilizations’. In 2004, however, he published 
another book instructively asking the question Who Are We? The book manifests considerable levels 
of anxiety that high levels of Hispanic immigration into the United States are posing a fundamental 
challenge to established conceptions of American identity as a country with a fundamentally Anglo-
Protestant heritage. In short, if something is not done quickly to reverse the trend, Huntington argued 
the America of the Founding Fathers would cease to exist (Huntington 2004). 
 
Arguments like Huntington’s have become the currency of populist politicians the world over and 
reflect a tendency to depict identities in essentialist terms. This is to say there is a belief that a fixed 
core lies at the heart of all identities – be they personal, national, civilizational etc. – and that if 
challenged threaten to turn us into something we are not. When identity is understood this way, as 
opposed to being viewed as socially constructed, flexible and always open for revision, identity 
becomes existential and something that needs to be defended at all costs. Such concerns can clearly 
be seen to underpin ongoing debates about the compatibility of Islam with Western values, and where 
Islam and Islamic practices (Sharia law, wearing headscarves etc) are seen by many in the West, not 
simply as being ‘non-Western’, but as posing a fundamental threat to the West. In Huntingtonian 
terms, the West and Islam are viewed as pitted against each other in a clash of civilizations, with this 
clash always liable to turn violent.   
 
Post-structuralist scholars of security have an important take on such tendencies. Although they view 
identity as socially constructed and malleable they argue that people generally act ‘as if’ their 
identities were primordial and fixed, while for politicians, making claims to identity in essentialised 
terms is generally much more politically effective than trying to convince citizens they should view the 
nation’s identity as socially constructed (Neumann 1999: 214-6). Moreover, post-structuralists have 
also argued that while the constitution of any identity is always dependent upon the identification of 
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that which it is not, there is also a strong temptation and tendency to frame difference/otherness in 
radicalised and threatening terms because the identification of the enemy helps crystallise our own 
claims to identity (Campbell 1998).  
 
The tendency to depict identities in ‘as if’ terms, however, is not simply an issue of political efficacy, 
but arguably responds to the deeper psychological anxieties people have about the nature of being 
and existence. As the literature on ‘ontological security’ (the security of being) has argued, our ability 
to ‘go on’ with every day life is dependent upon our ability to block out existential anxieties about the 
nature of being, about the imminence of death, and about who we really are (Giddens 1991). 
Narratives of self-identity, their production, performance and reinforcement, are a key mechanism by 
which ontological security can be generated. At a cognitive level they do this by positioning us in the 
world in relation to others and identifying what is deemed as significant. Emotionally, however, the 
sense of biographical continuity they foster is comforting and fundamental (Kinnvall 2004: 746). More 
particularly, though, individuals are prone to embed their own narratives of self-identity within those 
of larger groups like nations and/or religions. Connecting one’s identity to a broader collective, and 
vicariously living through the achievements of that group, offers individuals the illusion of life beyond 
death, but can also provide something positive, continuous, stable and safe for them to hold on to in 
situations when other aspects of their personal life may be uncertain (Kinnvall 2004: 742-4).  
 
One effect, however, is that ontological security is often reduced down to reinforcing particular 
conceptions of identity, with the preservation of specific identities becoming securitized. This is 
particularly liable in the face of dislocatory events. We might think here of terrorist attacks like 9/11, 
the 2005 bombings in London or the attacks in Paris in 2015. Such attacks generated anxiety in all 
these societies about the stability of national identity, the strength of social cohesion, the role of these 
countries in world politics. Ontological security analysis argues that when such anxieties emerge a 
typical response is to deflect them through identifying objects of fear to physical security that leave 
the core identity and sense of moral certitude and purpose of the society unscathed, thereby enabling 
systems of meaning about the nature of the world and identity to be re-established (Rumelili 2015). 
This process of ‘turning anxiety into fear’ (Steele 2008: 64 original emphasis) was also notably 
displayed by Donald Trump during his presidential nomination campaign, when, in the aftermath of 
the Paris attacks and a mass shooting carried out by two Muslims in San Bernardino (California), he 
called for ‘a total and complete shutdown of Muslims entering the US’ – a statement that explicitly 
identified all Muslims as inherently suspect and potential terrorists (BBC News 2015). 
 
Statements like this are obviously indicative of the temptation to securitize migrants as threats. In the 
discipline of International Relations, however, the concept of securitization has come to have specific 
meaning and has been the focus of vibrant research into the constitutive effects of presenting issues 
in the language of security. Most important has been the work of Ole Wæver (1995), who argues that 
in (international) politics security is inimically tied to discourses of ‘national security’. Therefore, when 
security is raised he argues it is always prone to become embedded in a ‘threat-defence’ logic, one 
that is ultimately connected to war and the survival of the realm. For Wæver, securitization is the 
process by which presenting something as a matter of security has the effect of identifying it as being 
of existential importance that thereby justifies the use of emergency and extraordinary measures to 
tackle it. In short, securitizing an issue can depoliticize it by closing down the bounds of legitimate 
debate as regards whether or not something should be treated in this way, or what measures are 
appropriate as a counter. This is because to do so can itself be construed as threatening national 
security (Buzan et al. 1998: 21-6). Security, therefore, is a language that carries considerable 
moral(ising) and political influence.  
 
Trump’s call to ban Muslim immigration into the United States is precisely just such an attempt to 
securitize an issue (a securitizing move), and like most securitizations it has the effect of drawing 
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categorical boundaries of difference between ‘us’ and ‘them’. It also, notably, calls for the imposition 
of exceptional and extraordinary measures – banning movement into the US of all members of a 
particular religious affiliation, much in the same way as his calls to build a wall are designed to keep 
Mexicans and other South American’s out. In this way the securitization of migration can be seen to 
have legitimated particular types of bordering practices that might in other times be viewed as 
unacceptable, or at least questionable. For instance, in Australia the securitization of migration has 
seen the country establish offshore detention centres where asylum seekers and refugees are held 
while their asylum claims are processed. Such centres often appear little different to prison camps and 
have been widely condemned by human rights organisations for their poor conditions and the implicit 
criminalization of migrants that they entail (Amnesty International 2013). Similarly, however, border 
control processes are being constantly enhanced, with many countries introducing new technologies 
(e.g. iris scanning equipment) and information gathering processes in order to weed out the 
undesirable from the desirable. However, border control practices are no longer confined to the 
border. Increasingly border control is happening within states, partly in recognition of the fact that 
many so called ‘illegal’ migrants actually crossed the border ‘legally’ in the first instance, but 
subsequently breached their visa conditions. One consequence in the UK, for instance, is that the 
government has now placed a legal duty on various organisations (not least universities) to enforce 
border control regulations, thereby implicitly turning large numbers of public sector workers into 
(often unwilling) agents of border security control. 
 
Dislocatory events like the terrorist attacks of 9/11, or the bombings in London and Paris, and the 
securitization of migration that has followed, has not only had effects in terms of promoting enhanced 
emphasis on border control. As argued above, attendant with the securitization of migration societies 
have also characteristically simultaneously been prone to securitizing core elements of their identity 
as a mechanism for coping with anxiety and enhancing ontological security. One important effect of 
this in the West has been to spark renewed debate as to the respective benefits of building national 
identities along either multiculturalist or assimilationist lines. During the 1990s many Western 
societies openly embraced multiculturalism, welcoming the cultural differences brought by migrants 
as enhancing and enriching established conceptions of national identity. Indeed, for many embracing 
cultural difference became viewed as the mark of a truly liberal society. Since 9/11, however, 
multiculturalism has increasingly, not simply been portrayed as misguided, but as having undermined 
national security insofar as it is argued it created fractured societies, with immigrant communities 
living in enclaves and rarely interacting with mainstream society. The fact that various ‘home grown’ 
terrorists emerged out of these communities has added to the sense of fear that surrounds them. In 
the opinion of Chancellor Angela Merkel, the multiculturalist experiment in Germany has ‘failed 
utterly’, (quoted in Connolly 2010) while British Prime Minister David Cameron (2011) has reflected 
populist sentiment by calling for a more ‘muscular liberalism’ that takes a stand on the nation’s core 
values and which expects immigrants to embrace them. Instead of multiculturalism, therefore, 
immigrants are increasingly expected to assimilate into a core conception of nationhood. 
 
However, such assertions raise important questions, not least with respect to identifying exactly what 
it is immigrants are expected to assimilate into. The notion of core values or conceptions of 
nationhood indicates that underpinning assimilationist arguments lie particular essentialist 
conceptions of national identity that can be articulated clearly and unproblematically. In practice, 
there is little agreement on these things. Thus, while for some wearing headscarves or other Islamic 
forms of attire is perfectly compatible with core conceptions of national selfhood in may Western 
states, for others it is not, and may even be felt as an affront and threatening and therefore something 
to be banned.  
 
One effect of this whole debate, however, is that it places migrants in the almost impossible position 
of constantly having to prove their belonging. Typically, such communities are subject to levels of 
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scrutiny that would be deemed unfair for others. A good example of this is how Muslims living in the 
West have, in recent years, been increasingly expected to publically condemn violent actions 
perpetrated by other Muslims since, for many people, their loyalty to the state is deemed inherently 
suspect. However, in making such declarations they already know these will not be fully believed and 
that they will be expected to repeat them. Also notable is that many of Europe’s 39 million Muslims 
are not migrants at all, but born in the states in which they reside. However, insofar as a discourse has 
emerged that depicts Islam as in some sense ‘non-Western’ then their religious identification can have 
the effect of placing them in the immigrant category and subject to scrutiny in ways that suggests their 
belongingness in the state in which they are citizens remains in question. Thus, while securitizing anti-
immigrant rhetoric can have the effect of reinforcing a sense of ontological security for the majority, 
it typically comes at the expense of undermining the security of migrants, for whom anxieties and 
threats to physical security are liable to increase. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
This chapter has argued that claims about the security implications of migration are always politically 
framed and never objective as such. To understand the nature of the migration-security nexus it is 
therefore necessary to be attuned to the various (and often implicit) assumptions that underlie claims 
about the security effects and threats of migration. This chapter has argued that doing this requires 
going back to first principles and interrogating claims about security by asking a number of basic 
questions. Key questions, it has been argued, are ‘whose security’, ‘what security entails’, ‘what is the 
threat’ and ‘how is security to be achieved’. However, it has also been argued that along with a focus 
on what security means, we also need to be attuned to what (the language of) security does. That is, 
how security focuses minds, mobilises people to action and, at times, can establish a threat-defence 
logic that can have significant effects in legitimising certain types of policy responses over others. 
Because of its constitutive power it is therefore important to consider the extent to which the 
presentation of migration in the language of security, does not simply describe a security reality and 
environment ‘out there’, but is constitutive of how we understand that environment and the threats 
we see. 
 
These considerations are important. Because of the pre-eminence attached to security, security is 
often depicted as beyond politics. When governments, politicians, security professionals or populist 
demagogues invoke security they often do so in a way that suggests that the issues they attach it to 
are of such magnitude that to challenge their claims is not only foolish, but also itself potentially 
threatening to national security. Security, in other words, is beyond debate. It is not. To the contrary, 
this chapter argues that claims about security necessarily need to be problematized because such 
claims are always working in the interests of some and against those of others. This makes them both 
deeply political, but also a point for concerted ethical reflection.  
 
To end where we began, Donald Trump’s depiction of Mexican/Islamic migration as a national security 
threat requiring the building of walls and the banning of Muslim immigration, not only points to very 
real challenges of how to manage the movement of large numbers of people across international 
borders, and how to successfully integrate them once they arrive, it also privileges state security over 
the human security of migrants. In doing so, it also constitutes those migrants as threats, and also 
often as targets of hate and dehumanisation. As the story of Aylan Kurdi exemplified, however, the 
demonization of migrants only serves to occlude from view the fact that the targets of such invective 
are often highly vulnerable and whose lives may have been characterized by high levels of insecurity. 
It also occludes from view the fact that such human insecurities are often themselves directly linked 
to the foreign, economic and environmental policies of the states which they are seeking to enter. 
Until those broader issues are tackled then a focus on enhanced and exclusionary (and sometimes 
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racist) border control measures is unlikely to solve the problems identified. To this extent, the 
referents of state security and human security are not as diametrically opposed as sometimes 
presumed. Indeed, the suggestion here is that in the long run prioritising human security is also the 
best way of enhancing state security.  
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